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Measuring Gross Disproportion in Environmental Precaution to 
Establish Regulatory Expropriation and Quantum of Compensation in 
International Investment Arbitration 
 
 
by David Collins and Philip Thomas+ 
ABSTRACT: 
 
This article applies a new methodology for the assessment of environmental risk 
prevention expenditure to the adjudication process of international investment 
arbitration. The Disproportion Factor Model can be implemented by investment 
arbitration tribunals to evaluate the reasonableness of environmental regulations 
imposed by host states that have a damaging impact upon foreign investment activity, 
such as would be the subject for a claim of indirect or regulatory expropriation. In this 
setting the Disproportion Factor Model can help illustrate whether a host state 
measure is unreasonable and in that sense should engage the investor’s entitlement to 
compensation under international law. It also acts as an objective guide to the setting 
of an appropriate quantum of compensation for the injured investor by reference to 
the environmental benefits that the regulation aimed to achieve relative to their costs, 
as evaluated by a rational decision-maker. The formula should be consequently 
viewed as a useful tool in judicial analysis by international investment tribunals. 
 
 
 
 
I   Introduction   
Claims of indirect expropriation are among the most common brought by foreign 
investors in international arbitration. Unlike formal expropriations in which the host 
state takes title to a foreign investor’s property outright, indirect expropriation 
embodies measures taken which have the effect, even if cumulatively, of depriving 
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the investor of most or all of the commercial benefit that they expected from their 
investments.  Indirect expropriation could take the form of a tax, licensing fee, or 
most notably for the purposes of this article an environmental regulation, such as that 
requiring that investors implement certain industrial safety precautions.  In theory the 
extent to which such an obligation is unreasonable in the sense that the burden to the 
investor is disproportionate to the benefit to itself and society will dictate the extent of 
compensation that the host state must pay.  Gauging the correct level of compensation 
for expropriation is a critical and often highly controversial exercise of investment 
tribunals constituted to assess liability and damages on the part of host states at the 
behest of injured foreign investors.1  This article will offer innovative guidance in the 
approach to this process by investment arbitration tribunals by applying a formula, 
drawn from the field of risk prevention mathematics and rooted in cost-benefit 
analysis.  This should offer much needed direction for adjudicators in the 
establishment of an objective, consistent and predictable approach to this important 
feature of dispute settlement in international investment law.    
 This article will begin by outlining the nature of claims that may be brought by 
foreign investors as a consequence of onerous environmental laws.  It will then 
introduce the Disproportion Factor equation which can be used to calculate reasonable 
levels of expenditure.  In part three this mathematical model will explain the point of 
indiscriminate decision and the permission point and how they can be used to define 
when the expenditure on environmental protection has become excessively 
disproportionate.  A hypothetical example drawn from the nuclear energy industry 
will be described in the final section for the purposes of illustration. 
 
                                               
1 See e.g. I Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) at 2 
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II  Regulatory Expropriation for Environmental Protection and Cost Benefit 
Analysis 
Regulation in the forms of taxes, fees, licenses or other forms of governmental 
interference can diminish the profitability of the investment activity to the point that it 
has become effectively useless, from a commercial standpoint, and as such can be 
considered acts of expropriation even where they serve a legitimate social aim2  
Measures enacted for environmental purposes have been the subject of several 
expropriation claims by foreign investors, perhaps most notably in the Metalclad 
dispute brought by a US company against Mexico3 and the Methanex dispute in which 
a Canadian company argued that a Californian state law prohibiting a certain chemical 
was a measure tantamount to expropriation.4  Both of these disputes were brought 
under the investment provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(‘NAFTA’).   
Recently the Swedish energy company Vattenfall threatened to file a claim in 
international arbitration against the German government under the Energy Charter 
Treaty (‘ECT’), an international treaty which provides guarantees to investors 
regarding illegitimate governmental interference with commercial activities.  This 
dispute relates to Germany’s decision to withdraw from its nuclear energy program 
following the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi incident, effectively an environmental as 
well as a health and safety based policy.  As of early 2013, Vattenfall claims that it 
                                               
2 R Dolzer and S Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
at 92-118 
3 Metalclad v Mexico, Award 30 August 2000, 5 ICSID Reports (2002) 209 (denial of a construction 
permit in relation to a hazardous waste landfill) 
4 Methanex v USA, Award 3 August 2005 44 ILM (2005) 1345 (ban of the gasoline additive methanol 
because of drinking water contamination) 
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will lose 700 million euros from investments made in nuclear power plants, which 
were made on the understanding that their life spans would be extended by Germany.5   
The increasing environmental awareness of many governments and policy 
makers around the world suggests that measures enacted for these purposes will 
intensify.6 In addition to the obvious potential for domestic litigation, over-zealous 
environmental regulatory activity could result in a greater number of claims brought 
by investors under international investment treaties and regional economic integration 
agreements, collectively termed international investment agreements (‘IIA’s), such as 
NAFTA and the ECT.  While there are more than 3000 of these instruments in 
operation,7 IIAs typically contain guarantees against expropriation without the 
payment of full compensation in addition to other protections such as a guarantee of 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, essentially encompassing due process in terms of the 
administration of regulations that impact foreign investors, and National Treatment, 
ensuring that foreign investors will not be discriminated against because of their 
foreign character.  Such assurances against unfair regulatory interference by host 
governments are thought to encourage mutually beneficial foreign direct investment 
(‘FDI’), especially in relation to states that have a history of disregard for foreign 
property or which are politically unstable.8  Guarantees against indirect (as well as the 
now uncommon direct) expropriation in IIAs typically consist of states’ obligations 
not to expropriate the assets of foreign investors unless this is done for a public 
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with due process and 
                                               
5  International Institute for Sustainable Development ‘Investment Treaty News’ Issue 2, vol 2 
December 2011/January at 14 
6 J Marlles, ‘Public Purpose, Private Losses: Regulatory Expropriation in International Investment 
Law’ 16 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 275 (2007) 
7 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012 at 18 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012overview_en.pdf> (accessed March 2013) 
8 The extent to which IIAs actually improve FDI flows is a subject of much controversy: see e.g. K 
Sauvant and L Sachs eds. The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 
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accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.9  IIAs, 
which were historically concluded between developed and developing countries, often 
elaborate that compensation must be paid without delay, be equivalent to the fair 
market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the taking and be in a 
fully realizable currency.10  Such provisions were intended to mitigate the risk of 
Western investors sinking enormous costs in commercial projects in highly unstable 
developing countries, although such guarantees may be equally enforced against 
developed countries that had traditionally been capital exporters.  As noted above, the 
obligation to pay compensation to injured investors is applicable notwithstanding the 
public purpose behind the value-diminishing regulation, such as whether the measure 
had an objective of environmental protection.  As one investment tribunal 
emphasized: 
 
Expropriatory environmental measures -- no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole – 
are ... similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its 
policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or 
international, the state's obligation to pay compensation remains.11 
 
 
Although the obligation to pay compensation for regulatory interference, such as 
those linked to environmental policies is well established, whether or not the measure 
constitutes an unreasonable interference worthy of compensation (as opposed to 
legitimate state action) as well as the manner in which the precise quantum of this 
compensation is calculated by arbitration tribunals is far from settled, in part due to 
                                               
9 E.g. Art 6 of the US Model BIT 1994 and Art 1110.1 of the North American Free Trade Agreement  
(‘NAFTA’).  This is the so-called Hull Formula. 
10 The so-called Hull Formula, see e.g. Art 7 of the US Model BIT and Art 1110.2 of NAFTA 
11 Award: Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID case No. 
ARB/96/1, 15 ICSID 
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difficulties associated with valuing the assets that are taken.12  The analysis of the 
quantum of compensation often pre-occupies arbitration panels during the merits 
stage of a dispute, even once an expropriation has been found to have occurred.  
Concepts such as fairness and adequacy of profit  have little practical significance, 
requiring highly contextualized analysis of the value of an asset as well as the purpose 
of the measure taken.13  
This process is complicated by the established principal that illegal 
expropriations, which are either discriminatory, do not serve a public purpose, or 
ignored due process, require a payment of damages to the foreign investor rather than 
simple compensation.14  Thus, it would appear as though a regulatory measure that 
diminished the value of a foreign investor’s asset undertaken ostensibly for an 
environmental purpose but which actually did not serve this aim, would require that 
the host state pay a greater quantum of compensation than if the measure was justified 
because of its beneficial impact upon society.  Some degree of proportionality 
between the regulatory burden and the policy objective is thought to be essential to 
legitimize state action.15  This inquiry lies at the heart of one of the central debates in 
international investment law and indeed public international law generally, namely 
the extent to which a host state may implement its sovereign right to regulate in the 
public interest where this conflicts with international obligations, including those that 
have an impact on private commercial actors located in their territory, which may or 
may not originate from abroad.  Arbitration tribunals can attempt to bring objectivity 
to the delicate balancing required in this assessment by resort to general principles of 
                                               
12 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 
208 
13 S Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart Publishing, 2008) at 
126 
14 Ibid at 74 
15 S Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, (Cambridge University Press, 
2009) at 378 
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international law, such as the right to full reparation in the case of illegal takings16 as 
well as accepted principles of accounting such as full market value, book value and 
other methods of asset valuation. 
Some valuable insight into this aspect of international adjudication, tied too 
closely to abstract notions or reasonableness and proportionality, may be gained 
through an application of economic analysis.  Law and economics scholars explore 
empirical methods for resolving the ambiguity inherent in the law’s reliance on the 
ubiquitous concept of reasonableness as a means of injecting greater coherence and 
predictability to the exercise of judicial discretion.  Indeed this type of methodology 
suggests that a correct approach to the judicial interpretation of the law can be 
achieved in reference to economic efficiency, meaning that benefits resulting from a 
certain legal rule were greater than costs.17 The transparent use of a strict cost-benefit 
analysis as a tool in assessing the reasonableness of safety precautions to avert human 
injury was demonstrated most famously in Judge Learned Hand’s equation from 
United States v Carroll Towing Co18 wherein he stated that an injurer will be found 
negligent if the burden of the precaution against harm (B) is less or equal to than the 
resulting benefit, which is a product of the magnitude of the injury (I) multiplied by 
the likelihood of it occurring (P):  B   IP.  Similarly, the UK Court of Appeal 
established in Edwards v. National Coal Board19 that health risks faced by employees 
should always be reduced unless the employer could demonstrate that there was 
“gross disproportion” between the costs and the benefits, meaning that the risk was 
insignificant in relation to the sacrifice.  This assessment implied that some over-
spend on safety is warranted, but not to the point of gratuitous waste.  Further, in 
                                               
16 As seen in the Chorzow Factory Case (Merits) Germany v Poland, PCIJ Rep (1928) Series A No. 17 
and Art 36 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility  
17 R.A Posner, ‘A Theory of Negligence’ 1 J of Legal Studies 28 (1972) 
18 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) 
19 [1949]  All ER 743 (CA) per Lord Asquith 
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Grimshaw v Ford Motor Company20 the California court rejected the defendant auto 
company’s argument that the disproportion factor needed to mandate the safety 
precaution necessaru to prevent sudden engine fires in certain car models would be 
too great at 2.8 (meaning that the cost of the precaution would be 2.8 times greater 
than the magnitude of the injury that it would avoid), finding against Ford.  The logic 
is clear – private citizens should not be expected to spend excessively when 
mitigating risks because to do so would act as a deterrent to socially productive 
commercial activity. 
Similar, typically less mathematically explicit methods of assessing the 
legitimacy of environmental risk control have appeared in numerous pieces of 
legislation, case law as well as government feasibility studies.21  This may reflect a 
trend towards greater sophistication in regulatory activity, perhaps itself the 
consequence of the mass availability of information upon which laws are based 
through the internet.  Environmental impact statements are now required for 
governmental approval of many schemes, including the acceptance of certain foreign 
investment projects by host states or FDI funding bodies.  Numerous international 
development banks mandate environmental cost-benefit analysis as a pre-condition 
for a FDI project’s receipt of support.  For example, the International Finance 
Corporation of the World Bank implements Performance Standards which require that 
investors seeking financial support for a development purpose must assess and 
manage the social and environmental costs of a project, compensating injured 
stakeholders where this is financially feasible (meaning that the cost to the investor 
                                               
20 (1981) 119 CA (3d) 757 
21 See C Sunstein, Risk and Reason:  Safety, Law and the Environment (Cambridge University Press, 
2002) noting for example cost benefit analysis in the Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. par 300 and in 
Chemical Manufacturers Association v Environmental Protection Agency 217 F 3d 861 (DC Cir 2000). 
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does not outweigh the benefit of proceeding with the project).22 The Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank states in its Performance Standards 
of Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement guidelines that investors must 
balance environmental costs and benefits when designing projects.23 While these 
international organizations are eager to enhance capital flows into developing 
countries, they are mindful that this often entails social costs that must be evaluated. 
 Despite the ubiquity of the economic perspective in policy materials, there a 
surprising dearth of economic analysis in the field of international investment law, 
particularly in relation to the quasi-judicial process of international investment 
arbitration in investor-state dispute settlement.  While there has been some empirical 
work devoted towards the perceived bias in international investment decisions,25 as 
well as to the dominant sources of law cited by International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitrators,26 assessment of the arbitrators’ reasoning in 
investment awards through quantifiable means, let alone cost-benefit-analysis, has 
thus far escaped academic scrutiny.  Such analysis is warranted because of the 
importance of reasonableness in the assessment of regulatory actions taken by host 
states, in particular those which may be viewed as indirect expropriations by foreign 
investors, and which will consequently engage an entitlement to some measure of 
monetary compensation.   
 In the international investment arbitration context, cost-benefit or economic 
analysis can be found implicitly in the exercise of proportionality-based adjudicatory 
discretion.  Scholars have observed that investment arbitrators who view themselves 
                                               
22 International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 1: Assessment and Management of 
Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts, 1 January 2012 [14] 
23 Performance Standard 5 Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement, 1 October 2007 [7] 
25 S Franck, ‘The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards’ 51 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (2011) 
26 O K Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals: An Empirical Analysis’ 19 European 
Journal of International Law 301 (2008) 
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as agents of a wider community evaluating the larger public impact of their decisions 
and recognizing the influence of their awards as precedents (as opposed to a narrower, 
party-specific commercial approach) are prone to engage in proportionality-balancing 
between the rights and obligations of investors and host states.27  This view can be 
seen, for example, in the Tecmed v Mexico decision: 
 
in addition to the negative financial impact of such actions or measures, the Arbitral Tribunal will 
consider, in order to determine if [the regulations] are to be characterized as expropriatory, whether 
such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the 
protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact has a 
key role upon deciding the proportionality. 28 
 
 
Assessing the proportionality between the financial harm suffered by the investor 
against the environmental gain to society was openly considered in the Total v 
Argentina29 dispute.  In deciding in favour of the investor and ordering compensation 
for expropriation, the tribunal examined an Argentine law which directed that levels 
of compensation for regulatory interference must take into account the extent of the 
burden placed upon the property owner: 
 
General modifications to regulations and procedures related to ... [e]nvironmental [p]rotection shall not 
entitle [the investor] to [c]laim any indemnification or compensation for damages, except ...when said 
modifications are arbitrary and cause compliance with the agreement [that are] extremely burdensome 
for [the investor]...30  
 
 
                                               
27 E.g. A Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier’ 4.1 Law & Ethics of 
Human Rights 47 (2010) 
28Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States (Mexico) (Additional Facility) 43 
I.L.M. 133 (2004) [122] 
29 Total S.A. (Claimant) v Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1 (Decision on 
Liability)  (21 Dec 2010) 
30 at 277 
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The phrase “extremely burdensome” is telling because it requires the national 
government and subsequently the arbitrator implementing the domestic law to assess 
not simply whether or not the environmental measure is financially injurious to the 
investor, but the extent to which that injury is out of proportion to the benefit it 
engenders, on the assumption that some degree of disproportion is acceptable.   
The problem therefore becomes: how can arbitrators, appointed on an ad hoc 
basis and chosen by the parties, decide whether a particular expense incurred in the 
fulfilment of a regulatory obligation for the purposes of protecting the environment is 
out-of-proportion to the benefit it engenders?  The answer will be tied to the costs 
suffered by the foreign investor, typically a firm engaging in some form of 
manufacturing or extraction, and the value received in terms of the prevention 
avoided.  It will also engage an assessment of the investor’s risk aversion.  Thus in 
order to evaluate the reasonableness of the regulatory safeguard imposed by the host 
state, it must be determined whether or not a private individual would choose that 
course of action in the absence of the law given the costs and benefits that are 
entailed.  Crucially this assessment hinges on the understanding that the decision-
maker, meaning the manager or owner of the firm in question that is considering 
whether or not to implement the precaution voluntarily, is choosing a course of action 
on the basis of rationality.  A rationally informed decision by a private individual 
should be the benchmark by which reasonableness of regulatory precaution should be 
assessed, establishing whether or not the measure was an expropriation and if so, how 
much compensation is required. 
 
 
II   Risk-aversion and the Decision to Invest in Environmental Precaution 
 12
Concerns regarding disproportionate spending on risk prevention by governmental 
authorities in the United Kingdom prompted risk scientists, P. J. Thomas, R. D. Jones 
and W. J. O. Boyle, to develop a mathematical model that evaluates the extent to 
which the decision to invest on a particular environmental risk prevention scheme is 
rational and can accordingly be viewed as a sensible decision by the firm.31  This 
model can provide normative guidance with respect to how much money a 
government, private company, or most importantly for the purposes of this analysis, a 
foreign investor, should be expected to spend on environmental safeguards, such as 
those that may be required pursuant to a law imposed by the country in which they 
operate.  Thus the model can help international investment arbitrators ascertain 
whether a particular regulation should be viewed as unfair, excessive, or an undue 
interference with private property rights, which may be framed as a claim of indirect 
expropriation or other treaty violation. 
A reasonable expenditure on an environmental safeguard may be calculated as 
the ratio of the actual expenditure to the maximum that is reasonable for a protection 
system guarding against expected environmental costs.  The concept of costs attempts 
to monetize what might be viewed more conventionally as economic injuries 
including those suffered by both the company and the region or ecosystem in which it 
is located.  Such costs could consist of structural damage to a factory or plant, ground 
contamination, expenses in evacuating and potentially relocating people, agricultural 
yield losses, business disruption as well as loss of reputation, and even loss of beauty 
or pleasure, to the extent that this can be quantified.  Other factors relevant to 
assessing these costs include pre-existing and remaining environmental hazards, the 
period that the protection system will operate and the growth rate of the organization 
                                               
31 P. J. Thomas and R. D. Jones, ‘Extending the J-value framework for safety analysis to include the 
environmental costs of a large accident’ 88 Process Safety and Environmental Protection 297 (2010) 
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or the foreign investment.  A regulation imposed by a host state which necessitates 
that a foreign investor spend more than this amount as derived dictates should be 
viewed as unreasonable by an international investment arbitration tribunal  and 
therefore indicative of a regulatory expropriation.  As suggested above, this 
conclusion is predicated in the intuitive assertion that governments should not expect 
private commercial enterprises to pursue policies that are based upon irrational 
decisions.   
In addition to determining whether or not the regulation should be viewed as 
an unfair interference and therefore engage the obligation to compensate, the formula 
discloses a Disproportion Factor, which indicates the extent to which the expenditure 
on protection exceeds the expected loss.  The expected loss, that is to say the potential 
loss multiplied by its probability of occurrence, is the amount that the company 
should be prepared to spend based purely on a standard cost-benefit analysis.  
However it may well be rational for the company to adopt a greater degree of aversion 
to risk and hence spend more than this minimum amount. 
 The Disproportion Factor model focuses on the role of risk-aversion in the 
decision-making process of company managers, which for the purposes of this article 
are taken to be foreign investors.  Risk-aversion expresses the degree to which a 
decision-maker is unwilling to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than 
another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff.  For 
example, a risk-averse investor might choose to put his savings into a bank account 
with a low but guaranteed interest rate, whereas someone who has a lower level of 
risk-aversion may choose to put his money in investments that may have high 
expected returns, but which also carries the danger of losing value.  Commercial 
enterprises tend to operate in a risk neutral manner, with a risk-aversion of zero, when 
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carrying out their normal business activities.  However an investor may demonstrate a 
higher risk-aversion when anticipating the effects of a large scale environmental 
disaster because of their public image and political sensitivity.32  Fears over negative 
reputational consequences such as those of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010 might influence investors in the petroleum industry to adopt a more cautious 
approach towards environmental safeguards.  The extent to which foreign investors 
seek political risk insurance as a means of offsetting risks such as these will not be 
explored in this article, although it should be noted that such insurance typically 
covers expropriations by host states.   
The assessment of decisions relating to environmental precaution is rooted in 
the logic of utility, meaning the total satisfaction received from consuming a good or 
service.  Utility is a means of analysis that is used widely in public planning as a 
means of interpreting public preferences.33 The application of utility theory to 
decision-making for the purpose of environmental protection is achieved by 
identifying four factors (ABCD) in a process often described as the ABCD model.34  A 
represents the total assets of the organization that is deciding whether or not to 
implement an environmental safety precaution.  For the purposes of this application of 
the model, the organization is a foreign investor and A will represent those assets that 
may be drawn upon to compensate for environmental damage in the country hosting 
the industrial plant.  These may be the assets of a national subsidiary, but the total 
assets of the international company might be considered in some cases, such as BP's 
Macondo oil release, because the company has such a major interest in the nation 
concerned.  B is the sum that the environmental protection system will cost that will 
                                               
32 Ibid at 300 
33 Ibid at 299 
34 PJ Thomas, RD Jones, WO Boyle, ‘The Limits of Risk Aversion: Part 1: The Point of Indiscriminate 
Decision’ 88 Process Safety and Environmental Protection 381 (2010) 
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reduce the probability of incurring the environmental costs from one larger figure to 
another smaller one, where the probability of the harm occurring is typically already 
small.  Clearly the B figure is derived from engineering as well as financial 
assessment, which for the purposes of this analysis is presumed to be an accurate 
representation of the economic costs and risk.  Thus the functionality of the formula is 
predicated on the assumption that real costs and risks can be fairly accurately 
measured.  B can stand for “balancing” as it balances the expenditure in precaution 
against the reduction in risk of harm, the crucial proportionality exercise associated 
with assessing the legitimacy of a host state’s laws.  C is the total environmental harm 
costs associated with the lack of implementation of the precaution system being 
considered.  Again this figure will be derived from an economic analysis of the 
adverse effects suffered, which are taken as fully capturing the magnitude of the 
damage both to the firm and to society.   
The D portion of the formula denotes the difference in the expected utilities of 
the organization’s wealth with and without the protection system.  The utility of the 
organization’s assets may simply be linear, meaning that it may be regarded as 
identical to their monetary value.  This corresponds to “risk neutrality”, meaning that 
the organization’s decision-makers will be concerned simply with maximising the 
organization's wealth.  Increasing the value expressed for the organisation’s risk-
aversion will tend to make it less reluctant to invest in a protection system.  It is 
important to recognize that risk-aversion is not a static value.  It will change for the 
same individual decision-maker according to the costs and benefits associated with 
the particular decision with which he is faced.  But even at high levels of risk-aversion 
the decision-maker will choose to pursue the safety investment only when the scheme 
is relatively close to financial break-even.  For such borderline schemes, where the 
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cost is close to the benefit, the amount the organisation is prepared to spend on the 
protection system will tend to rise as the risk-aversion increases.  This reflects the fear 
of bearing the financial and other burdens associated with  a large environmental 
disaster.  The ratio of the cost of the protection scheme that would be sanctioned at a 
given risk-aversion to the expected loss in its absence is identified as  the Limiting 
Risk Multiplier, the maximum value of which is governed by the maximum feasible 
value of risk-aversion.  
Appreciating the mental state of the decision-maker is crucial to understanding 
the value of this formula.  Accordingly, it must be recognized that increasing the 
decision maker’s risk-aversion will reduce the clarity, or rationality, of the process of 
choosing whether or not to undertake the safety precaution.  As a result, the capacity 
for discrimination between the two options will gradually diminish, being lost 
altogether at what has been called the Point of Indiscriminate Decision.  At this level 
of risk-aversion the decision maker will be able to distinguish neither advantage in 
installing the scheme nor disadvantage in installing its inverse, a hypothetical “danger 
system” that would actually lead to environmental harm.  The Point of Indiscriminate 
Decision provides a natural upper limit for the value of risk-aversion.  This bounds 
the Limiting Risk Multiplier in turn, and so sets an objective upper amount that it is 
rational to spend on an environmental protection system.  This is the level of spend 
that should be expected by the environmental law of the relevant jurisdiction.  
The formula yields further valuable insight into the decision-making process 
of the foreign investor.  At any risk-aversion level greater than zero (meaning that the 
decision-maker will apply more caution that he would than if he were trying merely to 
maximise wealth), the utility of wealth increases at a decreasing rate to the point that 
additional wealth results in limited additional utility.  Successive increments of utility 
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tend to decline sharply in proportion to the total wealth saved, meaning that a business 
will value initial savings greater than later ones of the same monetary value (saving 
10,000 euros rather than 0 will matter more than saving 90,000 euros instead of 
80,000 euros).35  This effect becomes more pronounced the higher the level of risk-
aversion, and, as a result, an improvement in utility level brought about by a money-
saving strategy will become very difficult to distinguish at a very high level of risk-
aversion.  
Company decision-makers will obviously seek to maximize their company’s 
expected utility.  This means that they will generally want to implement the 
environmental protection scheme if the scheme’s cost is outweighed by the increase in 
expected utility it brings about.  This will occur when the expected before-and-after 
utility difference (the D variable) is negative – the expected utility after 
implementation will be greater than the expected utility in the absence of the 
protection scheme. This means that the environmental precaution is expected to 
increase the value of the company’s assets.  Reluctance to spend on environmental 
precaution is directly linked to the expected impact on the value of the company’s 
assets. Again, this reveals the type of decision that should be viewed as conforming to 
national environmental laws. 
 Taking the company decision-maker's initial position as one of scepticism as 
to the usefulness of the environmental precaution, the reluctance to invest in the 
precaution can be defined by reference to the ratio between the expected before-and-
after utility difference (D in the ABCD model) to the starting utility measured relative 
to one unit of money. “Reluctance to invest” is a mathematically defined variable that 
simply provides a convenient scale by which to judge the motivation to invest in a 
                                               
35 P Thomas and R Jones, ‘JT Value Assessment of Schemes To Protect Against Accidents With High 
Human and Environmental Costs’ 43:5 Measurement and Control 152 (June 2010) 
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protection system. A 100 per cent reluctance to invest in the precaution, the 
equivalent of an outright refusal or unwillingness to do so, will be associated with a 
protection system that is so expensive that it is expected to reduce the utility of the 
company’s assets to zero.  A negative reluctance to invest will suggest an openness to 
investment in a protection scheme.  However, psychologists note that: 36 
 
There are two problems of behavior which any theory of motivation must come to grips with. 
... The first problem is to account for an individual's selection of one path of action among a 
set of possible alternatives. The second problem is to account for the amplitude or vigor of the 
action tendency once it is initiated, and for its tendency to persist for a time in a given 
direction. 
 
 
The variable, reluctance to invest, reflects these two key features of decision making..  
Thus an increase in risk-aversion may cause the reluctance to invest to go from 
positive to negative, but the “amplitude or vigor of the action tendency” will decrease 
at the same time.  At some point, when the risk-aversion has reached a very high 
value, the “amplitude of the action tendency” will be so small that the ideal, rational 
decision maker will be unable to detect it and hence would feel no enthusiasm to 
implement the precaution.  In such circumstances laws requiring the relevant 
precaution should be viewed as illegitimate or unreasonable. 
Companies should and will become more willing to spend money to avoid 
disasters as they become more worried about the consequences of not doing so.  If the 
use of the ABCD model suggests that a rational investor facing the decision to invest 
would be motivated to do so, both as regards the direction of the decision and the 
amplitude of the action tendency, then any environmental regulation requiring this 
                                               
36 J. W. Atkinson, ‘Motivational Determinants of Risk-Taking Behaviour’, 64:6 Psychological Review 
359 (1957) 
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investment should be tolerated by the company even if the Disproportion Factor is 
greater than unity.   
Where the expected payoff from installing protection is high, meaning that the 
environmental precaution is expected to save the investor money (equivalent to 
adding to the company's expected utility, measured at a risk-aversion of zero), 
increasing the company’s risk-aversion above zero will not change the orientation of 
the decision maker towards the implementation  of the precaution.  However, it will 
decrease his motivation to do so because of the increasing difficulty noted earlier in 
distinguishing utility improvements as the level of risk-aversion becomes higher. The 
“amplitude or vigor of the action tendency” will be at a very low level.  As suggested 
above, at some value of risk-aversion, the company decision makers will be unable to 
see the benefit of even an environmental precaution that can be expected to save their 
firm money.  This mathematical result from utility theory may be explained 
intuitively as describing the situation where the decision makers become so enveloped 
in gloom that they do not believe that any action will make a difference – even a 
system of good value (cost relative to level of prevention) will not assuage their fears.   
For protection schemes that are clearly of poor value, meaning that the 
monetary cost to the company now outweighs the financial benefits in terms of 
probability and magnitude of environmental harm as assessed, a similar phenomenon 
will occur as risk-aversion increases.  Now the disbenefit, seen very sharply at a risk-
aversion of zero (when only the money matters), will lose clarity as the risk-aversion 
level of the decision maker increases.  Again, at some high level of risk-aversion, the 
company decision makers will be unable to distinguish the disbenefit of abolishing an 
environmental precaution that can be expected to save their firm money.  Intuitively 
the decision makers may be imagined to be enveloped in the same despair  described 
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above, and will feel that, since no action on their part is going to make much if any 
difference, it does not matter what action they chose.  It is clear that no rational 
investor should allow his risk-aversion to reach the level where he was unable to 
distinguish between the merits of a scheme that increased protection and one that 
diminishes protection for the environment.  
 
 
III   Point of Indiscriminate Decision, Permission Point and Excessively 
Disproportionate Expenditure 
The ABCD analysis indicates that there is a level of risk-aversion at which the 
investor will have to make a decision (because doing nothing is still a decision) but 
will be unable to discriminate amongst any of the options available to him because to 
him there is no measurable difference.  This is described as the Point of 
Indiscriminate Decision and it means that the decision taken at this level of risk-
aversion is not related to any rational process.  At this point the decision to implement 
the protection measure or not will be essentially random.  This condition can be 
observed in individuals who enter a state of panic – perceptions are distorted and 
rational control over decisions is lost.  No decision-maker should raise his risk-
aversion to the point of indiscriminate decision or beyond because this will mean that 
he is not assessing options rationally but rather exhibiting a random, thoughtless 
response.  Determining the maximum rational risk-aversion sets an upper bound on 
the Disproportion Factor, and so sets an objective upper limit on the amount that it is 
rational to spend on an environmental protection system.  Thus any domestic laws 
calling for precautions in excess of this level should be viewed as manifestations of 
indirect expropriation.  
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 Given a protection scheme of given cost, the rational decision maker will mull 
over the decision on whether or not to implement by varying his risk-aversion to find 
the value at which he experiences the minimum reluctance to invest.  This value is 
known as the “permission point”.  If his minimum reluctance is now negative and the 
permission point is less than the point of indiscriminate decision, then the protection 
scheme should be implemented.  This will include cases where the Disproportion 
Factor is greater than unity.  If, however, the cost of the protection scheme is higher 
than the maximum rational cost, which is the product of the Disproportion Factor and 
the expected loss, then the cost is excessively disproportionate.  The excess may be 
quantified precisely as the cost minus the maximum rational cost.  Thus a level of 
compensation for the expropriation can be established. 
 
 
IV  The Disproportion Factor Model and Investment Arbitration: A 
Hypothetical Example 
The operation of the Disproportion Factor Model in the sphere of international 
investment arbitration is best illustrated through an example.  An electricity company 
from the fictional state of Ruristan, Protopower, has just finished building a nuclear 
reactor in Germany to supply electricity to the local population.  Ruristan and 
Germany concluded an IIA that is the same as the text in the 2008 German Model 
BIT. Given widespread fears regarding nuclear energy in the aftermath of the 
Japanese tsunami, the German government subsequently conducts an environmental 
impact statement and imposes a requirement on Protopower that it should build a 
tertiary containment structure costing 200 million euros to reduce the frequency of a 
large release of radioactive contaminant from a conservatively assessed current figure 
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of one in a 100 thousand years to one in a 100 million years.  The plant lifetime is 60 
years, and the estimated environmental cost of such a release, should it happen, is 20 
billion euros.   Assessing the financial impact of the regulation and the potential risk 
that the associated environmental precaution could prevent, Protopower takes into 
account the fact that its German subsidiary has total assets of 21 billion euros that it 
can draw on to provide compensation if necessary, and the growth rate of that 
subsidiary has averaged 4 per cent per annum for the past 10 years. 
The maximum sensible spend to achieve this reduction in accident probability 
is given by the equation drawn from the work of Thomas and Jones37 for the risk-
neutral case.  The basis of this calculation is to equate the additional expenditure on 
the safety system with the reduction in the expected cost of an accident.  The 
maximum sensible spend to implement this safety scheme ( Z ) is given by the 
product of the Limiting Risk Multiplier ( RM ) and the maximum cost of the scheme in 
the risk-neutral case ( 0Z ): 
 
0ZMZ R      
38 
 
For the risk-neutral case, the maximum that should be spent on the scheme is equal to 
the reduction in expected accident costs.39  This is given by: 
                                               
37 Thomas and Jones, above note 31 (Equation 30) 
38 Ibid (Equation 32) 
39 If the company’s initial assets are A (euros) and it has a growth rate of rorg (per year) then, if no 
accident occurs, its final assets after a plant lifetime of T (years) will be TrorgAe .  Should one or more 
accidents occur, the company’s final assets will be reduced by the expected cost of the accidents, 
)(1 CAC KM , which has been decomposed into the expected cost assuming no growth, CK , and a 
multiplier which accounts for the growth of the remaining assets, ACM 1 .  Equation 18 of Thomas and 
Jones, ibid., gives 
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where orgr  is the growth rate of the company (4 per cent per year), T  is the lifetime of 
the safety measure (60 years), C  is the cost of an accident ( 10102  euros) and 1  and 
2  are the accident frequencies without and with the safety scheme (
510  per year 
and 810  per year, respectively).  Substituting the figures for the Protopower scheme 
gives a maximum risk-neutral spend of 60 1061.4 Z  euros. 
 
In the limiting case of zero growth, this risk-neutral spend is simply expressed 
as TCZ )( 210   , where C is the accident cost, λ1 and λ2 are the accident 
frequencies before and after the safety measure, and T is the lifetime of the safety 
measure.40 With a growth rate of 4 per cent per annum and the accident costs and 
                                                                                                                                      
where C is the cost (euros) of a single accident and λ is the frequency (per year) of an accident.  
Equation D4 of Thomas and Jones, ibid., gives 
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Denoting )(WU as the utility of wealth W , then the expected utility of the company after T  years 
without the safety scheme will be 
))(()1()()( 111 11  CAC
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where the probability of there being no accident in the interval T   is Tep 
 .  If the company 
spends an amount 0Z  on the safety scheme to reduce the accident frequency from 1  to 2 , then 
although the assets will be reduced by this amount, the expected cost of the accident will also be 
reduced.  The expected utility after implementation of the scheme is then 
))()(()1())(()( 21002 22   CAC
TrTr
T KMeZAUpeZAUpuE orgorg  . 
The maximum that should be spent on the safety system occurs when the expected utility does not 
change after implementing the scheme, viz. )()( 12 TT uEuE  .  Noting that WWU )(  for the 
risk-neutral case, the maximum rational cost is 
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(from equation 30 of Thomas and Jones, ibid., substituting the definition of )(CK  in the final step). 
40 Ibid (Equation 31). 
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frequencies as above, the full calculation gives a maximum risk-neutral spend of 4.61 
million euros. 
The Limiting Risk Multiplier is calculated as follows41.  The numerical 
approach42 iterates over values of the risk multiplier, 1rm .  As the risk multiplier 
increases, the risk-aversion ( ) of the Permission Point also increases until it reaches 
its limiting value of max pp  at the Point of Indiscriminate Decision – this then 
corresponds to the maximum value of the risk multiplier, )( maxmax rr mm  . This 
                                               
41 Thomas, Jones and  Boyle, above note 34, (Appendix A2) 
42 In the ABCD model, the reluctance to invest, AR120 , is defined as the difference in expected utility 
of the company before, )( 1uE , and after, )( 2uE , the scheme is introduced, normalized to the 
expected utility of the starting assets, )( 0uE , 
)(
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0
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The utility function is taken to be that of Atkinson (A. B. Atkinson, ‘On the measurement of inequality’ 
J. Econ. Theory, 2, 244, (1970)),  
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where W  is the wealth of the organisation and   is the elasticity of marginal utility or “risk-
aversion.”  The reluctance to invest can be expressed as 
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where A , 
1
p  and 2p  are defined above, and the lower case letters denote costs normalised to the 
assets: ABb /  and  ACc / . 
In the risk-neutral case ( 0 ), the normalised cost of the scheme ( 0b ) will be exactly balanced by 
the expected normalised cost of the accident when 0120 AR .  Substituting these values into the 
equation for AR120  gives cppb )( 120   .  The risk multiplier, )(rm , is defined as the ratio of 
the cost of any given scheme (b ) to this risk-neutral cost, 0/)( bbmr  .  In practice, it is 
convenient to express the reluctance to invest in terms of rm  rather than b . 
The minimum reluctance to invest (the Permission Point) occurs at a risk-aversion of pp .  For any 
given set of parameters, this minimum can be found numerically by iterating over the risk-aversion, 
0 , to compute AR120  at each point.  At large values of risk-aversion, the reluctance to invest 
approaches an asymptote of 0120 AR .  The Point of Indiscriminate Decision occurs when the 
function approaches this asymptote such that 6120 10
AR , corresponding to the maximum risk-
aversion for a rational decision maker, max .  Again, this point can be found numerically. 
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maximum risk multiplier is a close approximation to the Limiting Risk Multiplier. 43  
For the Protopower safety scheme, the Limiting Risk Multiplier is calculated to be 
3.56.  Hence the maximum that Protopower should be prepared to spend on the 
tertiary containment structure is 4.161061.456.3 60  ZMZ R  million euros.  
Protopower concludes therefore that it does not wish to implement the measure at a 
cost of 200 million euros.  
Wishing to continue operating in Germany, Protopower instigates the 
environmental precaution as required under the law and against its better judgment, 
demanding compensation from the government for the cost by asserting that the 
measure was a form of regulatory expropriation.  The German government refuses to 
pay, stating that the law was a reasonable exercise of regulatory discretion for the 
purposes of protecting the environment from radiation.  Pursuant to Art 10 of the 
Germany-Ruristan bilateral investment treaty, Protopower brings a claim in 
international arbitration against Germany at ICSID. Their claim is based on 
Germany’s alleged violation of Art 4(2) of the treaty, guaranteeing that there will be 
no expropriation of foreign investors’ assets without full compensation.  The question 
falling to the arbitration tribunal is first, whether or not the regulation dictating that 
the safety precaution on the nuclear power plant investment should be viewed as 
unreasonable and therefore a measure tantamount to expropriation.  If the measure is 
not viewed as an act of expropriation, then no compensation is payable to Protopower 
by the German government.  Secondly, in the event that the answer to the first 
question is that the regulation is not reasonable and therefore does constitute a form of 
indirect expropriation, the tribunal must determine the level at which compensation 
                                               
43 ibid 
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should be set to compensate the investor for the loss of value of their assets, namely 
the nuclear plant.   
Given that the required spend exceeds the maximum that rational decision 
maker should be willing to spend, the environmental regulation should be viewed by 
an investment tribunal as grossly disproportionate and therefore an act of 
expropriation.  Secondly, the amount of compensation due to the investor would 
consist of the extent to which the regulation was unreasonable, meaning that it 
imposed costs that did not lead to justifiable outputs in terms of environmental 
protection.  By the Disproportion Factor Model, the maximum amount that is would 
have been reasonable to ask Protopower to spend on extra protection would have been 
16 million euros.  Therefore Protopower should be entitled to 200 million euros − 16 
million euros  = 184 million euros in compensation. 
 
 
V  Conclusion 
Applying utility theory together with the auxiliary concepts of the Point of 
Indiscriminate Decision and the Permission Point, the Disproportion Factor model 
offers a mathematical justification for the concept of gross disproportion with respect 
to protection systems to guard against environmental loss.  This method is important 
because the concept of regulatory expropriation in international investment law, is 
informed by this often highly discretionary consideration, an assessment of which 
falls to international arbitration tribunals as the specified for a for the resolution of 
disputes brought under IIAs.  The Disproportion Factor model, which can be applied  
without the need for a sophisticated understanding of the underlying mathematical 
calculations, can provide useful guidance to investment arbitrators in the 
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determination of whether regulations imposed by host states against foreign investors 
should be viewed as indirect expropriations.  It therefore clarifies whether there is an 
obligation on the part of the host state to pay compensation, or whether their 
regulatory actions should be viewed as legitimate exercises of governmental authority 
necessary to ensure environmental safety.  Perhaps even more valuable is the 
Disproportion Factor’s contribution to the gauging of an appropriate quantum of 
compensation.  Rather than simply issuing a binary result of reasonable or 
unreasonable, the method yields a measurement of the degree of unreasonableness of 
a particular regulation relative to its costs and benefits, which can be readily adapted 
to disclose a total level of monetary compensation.  The logic of the formula is that 
foreign investors, as with any private citizens, should not be forced to engage in 
behaviour that they would choose not to, were they fully informed of the costs to 
themselves and to society of their actions, and able to make the decision rationally.  
The ABCD model simulates the actions of a rational decision maker, and thus acts as 
an idealised proxy for the decision maker in the organisation in question.  It is 
presumed that no person should be forced by law to act in an irrational way.   
Whether a regulation that required a Disproportion Factor non-compliant 
spend might also be viewed as a breach of other international investment law 
protections, such as the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard seen in many IIAs in 
addition to indirect expropriation has not been examined here.  The threshold for fair 
and equitable treatment  violations is usually seen as a high one.  For example, the 
tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic stated that fair and equitable treatment  requires 
that the host state “will not act in a way that is manifestly inconsistent, non-
transparent (i.e. unrelated to some rational policy) or discriminatory (based on 
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unjustifiable distinctions).”45  Furthermore, the Disproportion Factor model as 
considered here does not address harms to human health which may ensue from 
failures to instigate certain industrial safety precautions and which may often be a key 
component of environmentally-focused regulations.  In order to capture human harms 
as well, the figure derived from the Disproportion Factor analysis must be 
incorporated with another formula, the J-Value assessment, giving the more 
comprehensive JT-value (or Total Judgment Value) which has not been discussed in 
this article. 46  
Finally, the functionality of formula as an interpretive aid to adjudication is 
contingent upon accurate quantification of environmental costs and benefits, which is 
by no means  certain.  Nor can the frequencies of occurrence before and after a 
protection system has been installed be captured with absolute accuracy.  While it 
may be somewhat less difficult to establish the financial costs to an investor’s assets 
in terms of physical damage as well as the organization’s role in an environmental 
disaster, the monetization of environmental harm may necessitate highly unscientific 
judgements, such as the value to society of cleaner air and a more aesthetically 
pleasing landscape. Nevertheless it can be expected that figures for environmental 
damage and frequency of occurrence may be found that may be agreed between the 
two parties even if their true values retain a degree of uncertainty. 
Still, the value of the Disproportion Factor as a means of grounding the often 
highly ambiguous concept of reasonableness in the context of indirect expropriation 
in international investment law should not be understated.  The formula’s method of 
                                               
45 Saluka v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006 
46 P Thomas and R Jones, ‘JT-Value Assessment of Schemes To Protect Against Accidents With High 
Human and Environmental Costs 43:5 Measurement and Control 152 (2010).  The J-Value has been 
applied to decision-making by the World Trade Organization 1Dispute Settlement Body: D Collins, 
‘Health Protection at the World Trade Organization - The J-Value as a Universal Standard for 
Reasonableness of Regulatory Precautions’ 43:5 Journal of World Trade 1071-1091 (2009) 
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objectively balancing between the costs and benefits of a particular course of action is 
a highly valuable tool in arbitral decision-making as it provides helpful direction 
regarding the extent of environmental precautions that governments should expect 
private citizens to take on the basis of informed rationality.  This will in turn assist 
investors in appreciating the level of risk inherent in particular FDI projects as well as 
provide host states with a more full understanding of the level of investor expectation 
engendered by their commitments made in IIAs.  Taken together this should reduce 
the uncertainty associated with engaging in foreign investment, surely enhancing 
global FDI flows. 
 
